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The Aruba Certified Network Security Associate certification is highly valued in the IT industry and can lead to lucrative career opportunities. It validates the skills and knowledge of individuals who are responsible for the security of wired and wireless networks. The HPE6-A78 exam is an essential step towards obtaining this certification and is an excellent opportunity for IT professionals to enhance their skills and advance their careers.

 

NEW QUESTION # 77
From which solution can ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) receive detailed information about client device type OS and status?

• A. ClearPass Guest
• B. ClearPass OnGuard
• C. ClearPass Access Tracker
• D. ClearPass Onboard

Answer: B

Explanation:
ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) can receive detailed information about client device type, OS, and status from ClearPass OnGuard. ClearPass OnGuard is part of the ClearPass suite and provides posture assessment and endpoint health checks. It gathers detailed information on the status and security posture of devices trying to connect to the network, such as whether antivirus software is up to date, which operating system is running, and other details that characterize the device's compliance with the network's security policies.
:
Aruba ClearPass product documentation that details the capabilities of ClearPass OnGuard.
Network security resources that describe endpoint health checks and the importance of device posture assessment for access control.

NEW QUESTION # 78
You have configured a WLAN to use Enterprise security with the WPA3 version.
How does the WLAN handle encryption?

• A. Traffic is encrypted with AES and keys derived from a PMK shared by all clients on the WLAN.
• B. Traffic is encrypted with AES and keys derived from a unique PMK per client.
• C. Traffic is encrypted with TKIP and keys derived from a unique PMK per client.
• D. Traffic is encrypted with TKIP and keys derived from a PMK shared by all clients on the WLAN.

Answer: B

Explanation:
WPA3-Enterprise is a security protocol introduced to enhance the security of wireless networks, particularly in enterprise environments. It builds on the foundation of WPA2 but introduces stronger encryption and key management practices. In WPA3-Enterprise, authentication is typically performed using 802.1X, and encryption is handled using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
WPA3-Enterprise Encryption: WPA3-Enterprise uses AES with the Galois/Counter Mode Protocol (GCMP) or Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP), both of which are AES-based encryption methods. WPA3 does not use TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol), which is a legacy encryption method used in WPA and early WPA2 deployments and is considered insecure.
Pairwise Master Key (PMK): In WPA3-Enterprise, the PMK is derived during the 802.1X authentication process (e.g., via EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS). Each client authenticates individually with the authentication server (e.g., ClearPass), resulting in a unique PMK for each client. This PMK is then used to derive session keys (Pairwise Transient Keys, PTKs) for encrypting the client's traffic, ensuring that each client's traffic is encrypted with unique keys.
Option A, "Traffic is encrypted with TKIP and keys derived from a PMK shared by all clients on the WLAN," is incorrect because WPA3 does not use TKIP (it uses AES), and the PMK is not shared among clients in WPA3-Enterprise; each client has a unique PMK.
Option B, "Traffic is encrypted with TKIP and keys derived from a unique PMK per client," is incorrect because WPA3 does not use TKIP; it uses AES.
Option C, "Traffic is encrypted with AES and keys derived from a PMK shared by all clients on the WLAN," is incorrect because, in WPA3-Enterprise, the PMK is unique per client, not shared.
Option D, "Traffic is encrypted with AES and keys derived from a unique PMK per client," is correct. WPA3-Enterprise uses AES for encryption, and each client derives a unique PMK during 802.1X authentication, which is used to generate unique session keys for encryption.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"WPA3-Enterprise enhances security by using AES encryption with GCMP or CCMP. In WPA3-Enterprise mode, each client authenticates via 802.1X, resulting in a unique Pairwise Master Key (PMK) for each client. The PMK is used to derive session keys (Pairwise Transient Keys, PTKs) that encrypt the client's traffic with AES, ensuring that each client's traffic is protected with unique keys. WPA3 does not support TKIP, which is a legacy encryption method." (Page 285, WPA3-Enterprise Security Section) Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Wireless Security Guide notes:
"WPA3-Enterprise requires 802.1X authentication, which generates a unique PMK for each client. This PMK is used to derive AES-based session keys, providing individualized encryption for each client's traffic and eliminating the risks associated with shared keys." (Page 32, WPA3 Security Features Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, WPA3-Enterprise Security Section, Page 285.
HPE Aruba Networking Wireless Security Guide, WPA3 Security Features Section, Page 32.

NEW QUESTION # 79
You configure an ArubaOS-Switch to enforce 802.1X authentication with ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) denned as the RADIUS server Clients cannot authenticate You check Aruba ClearPass Access Tracker and cannot find a record of the authentication attempt.
What are two possible problems that have this symptom? (Select two)

• A. Clients are configured to use a mismatched EAP method from the one In the CPPM service.
• B. Clients are not configured to trust the root CA certificate for CPPM's RADIUS/EAP certificate.
• C. The RADIUS shared secret does not match between the switch and CPPM.
• D. CPPM does not have a network device defined for the switch's IP address.
• E. users are logging in with the wrong usernames and passwords or invalid certificates.

Answer: B,E

NEW QUESTION # 80
What role does the Aruba ClearPass Device Insight Analyzer play in the Device Insight architecture?

• A. It resides in the cloud and manages licensing and configuration for Collectors
• B. It resides In the cloud and applies machine learning and supervised crowdsourcing to metadata sent by Collectors
• C. It resides on-prem and provides the span port to which traffic is mirrored for deep analytics.
• D. It resides on-prem and is responsible for running active SNMP and Nmap scans

Answer: B

Explanation:
The Aruba ClearPass Device Insight Analyzer plays a crucial role within the Device Insight architecture by residing in the cloud and applying machine learning and supervised crowdsourcing to the metadata sent by Collectors. This component of the architecture is responsible for analyzing vast amounts of data collected from the network to identify and classify devices accurately. By utilizing machine learning algorithms and crowdsourced input, the Device Insight Analyzer enhances the accuracy of device detection and classification, thereby improving the overall security and management of the network.
:
Aruba ClearPass official documentation and whitepapers that detail the functionality and deployment of the Device Insight Analyzer.
Technical articles and presentations on network security solutions that discuss the use of machine learning and data analytics in device management.

NEW QUESTION # 81
Refer to the exhibits.
A company has added a new user group. Users in the group try to connect to the WLAN and receive errors that the connection has no Internet access. The users cannot reach any resources. The first exhibit shows the record for one of the users who cannot connect. The second exhibit shows the role to which the AOS device assigned the user's client.
What is a likely problem?

• A. The clients rejected the server authentication on their side because they do not have the root CA for CPPM's RADIUS/EAP certificate.
• B. The AOS device has a server derivation rule configured on it that has overridden the role sent by CPPM.
• C. The role name that CPPM is sending does not match the role name configured on the AOS device.
• D. The AOS device does not have the correct RADIUS dictionaries installed on it to understand the Aruba-User-Role VSA.

Answer: C

Explanation:
The scenario involves an AOS-8 Mobility Controller (MC) with a WLAN where a new user group has been added. Users in this group cannot connect to the WLAN, receiving errors indicating no Internet access and inability to reach resources. Exhibit 1 shows the ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) Access Tracker record for one user:
CPPM sends an Access-Accept with the VSA Radius:Aruba:Aruba-User-Role user_group4.
The endpoint is classified as "Known," but the user cannot access resources. Exhibit 2 (not provided but described) shows that the AOS device (MC) assigned the user's client to the "denyall" role, which likely denies all access, explaining the lack of Internet and resource access.
Analysis:
CPPM sends the Aruba-User-Role VSA with the value "user_group4," indicating that the user should be assigned to the "user_group4" role on the MC.
However, the MC assigns the client to the "denyall" role, which typically denies all traffic, resulting in no Internet or resource access.
The issue lies in why the MC did not apply the "user_group4" role sent by CPPM.
Option A, "The AOS device does not have the correct RADIUS dictionaries installed on it to understand the Aruba-User-Role VSA," is incorrect. If the MC did not have the correct RADIUS dictionaries to understand the Aruba-User-Role VSA, it would not process the VSA at all, and the issue would likely affect all users, not just the new user group. Additionally, Aruba-User-Role is a standard VSA in AOS-8, and the dictionaries are built into the system.
Option B, "The AOS device has a server derivation rule configured on it that has overridden the role sent by CPPM," is incorrect. Server derivation rules on the MC can override roles sent by the RADIUS server (e.g., based on attributes like username or NAS-IP), but there is no indication in the scenario that such a rule is configured. If a derivation rule were overriding the role, it would likely affect more users, and the issue would not be specific to the new user group.
Option C, "The clients rejected the server authentication on their side because they do not have the root CA for CPPM's RADIUS/EAP certificate," is incorrect. If the clients rejected the server authentication (e.g., due to a missing root CA for CPPM's certificate), the authentication would fail entirely, and CPPM would not send an Access-Accept with the Aruba-User-Role VSA. The scenario confirms that authentication succeeded (Access-Accept was sent), so this is not the issue.
Option D, "The role name that CPPM is sending does not match the role name configured on the AOS device," is correct. CPPM sends the role "user_group4" in the Aruba-User-Role VSA, but the MC assigns the client to the "denyall" role. This suggests that the role "user_group4" does not exist on the MC, or there is a mismatch in the role name (e.g., due to case sensitivity, typos, or underscores vs. hyphens). In AOS-8, if the role specified in the Aruba-User-Role VSA does not exist on the MC, the MC falls back to a default role, which in this case appears to be "denyall," denying all access. The likely problem is that the role name "user_group4" sent by CPPM does not match the role name configured on the MC (e.g., it might be "user-group4" or a different name).
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"When the Mobility Controller receives an Aruba-User-Role VSA in a RADIUS Access-Accept message, it attempts to assign the specified role to the client. If the role name sent by the RADIUS server (e.g., 'user_group4') does not match a role configured on the controller, the controller will fall back to a default role, such as 'denyall,' which may deny all access. To resolve this, ensure that the role name sent by the RADIUS server matches the role name configured on the controller, accounting for case sensitivity and naming conventions (e.g., underscores vs. hyphens)." (Page 306, Role Assignment Troubleshooting Section) Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide notes:
"A common issue when assigning roles via the Aruba-User-Role VSA is a mismatch between the role name sent by ClearPass and the role name configured on the Aruba device. If the role name does not match (e.g., 'user_group4' vs. 'user-group4'), the device will not apply the intended role, and the client may be assigned a default role like 'denyall,' resulting in access issues. Verify that the role names match exactly in both ClearPass and the device configuration." (Page 290, RADIUS Role Assignment Issues Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Role Assignment Troubleshooting Section, Page 306.
HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide, RADIUS Role Assignment Issues Section, Page 290.

NEW QUESTION # 82
What is the purpose of an Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) server?

• A. It helps admins to avoid expired certificates with less management effort.
• B. It provides a secure central repository for private keys associated with devices' digital certif-icates.
• C. It provides a more secure alternative to private CAs at less cost than a public CA.
• D. It acts as an intermediate Certification Authority (CA) that signs end-entity certificates.

Answer: A

NEW QUESTION # 83
You are checking the Security Dashboard in the Web UI for your AOS solution and see that Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) has discovered a rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security. What correctly describes a threat that the radio could pose?

• A. It could be attempting to conceal itself from detection by changing its BSSID and SSID frequently.
• B. It is running in a non-standard 802.11 mode and could effectively jam the wireless signal.
• C. It could open a backdoor into the corporate LAN for unauthorized users.
• D. It is flooding the air with many wireless frames in a likely attempt at a DoS attack.

Answer: C

Explanation:
The AOS Security Dashboard in an AOS-8 solution (Mobility Controllers or Mobility Master) provides visibility into wireless threats detected by the Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system. The scenario describes a rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security. Ad hoc mode in 802.11 allows devices to communicate directly with each other without an access point (AP), forming a peer-to-peer network. Open security means no encryption or authentication is required to connect.
Ad Hoc Mode Threat: An ad hoc network created by a rogue device can pose significant risks, especially if a corporate client connects to it. Since ad hoc mode allows direct device-to-device communication, a client that joins the ad hoc network might inadvertently bridge the corporate LAN to the rogue network, especially if the client is also connected to the corporate network (e.g., via a wired connection or another wireless interface).
Option B, "It could open a backdoor into the corporate LAN for unauthorized users," is correct. If a corporate client connects to the rogue ad hoc network (e.g., due to a misconfiguration or auto-connect setting), the client might bridge the ad hoc network to the corporate LAN, allowing unauthorized users on the ad hoc network to access corporate resources. This is a common threat with ad hoc networks, as they bypass the security controls of the corporate AP infrastructure.
Option A, "It could be attempting to conceal itself from detection by changing its BSSID and SSID frequently," is incorrect. While changing BSSID and SSID can be a tactic to evade detection, this is not a typical characteristic of ad hoc networks and is not implied by the scenario. Ad hoc networks are generally visible to WIP unless explicitly hidden.
Option C, "It is running in a non-standard 802.11 mode and could effectively jam the wireless signal," is incorrect. Ad hoc mode is a standard 802.11 mode, not a non-standard one. While a rogue device could potentially jam the wireless signal, this is not a direct threat posed by ad hoc mode with open security.
Option D, "It is flooding the air with many wireless frames in a likely attempt at a DoS attack," is incorrect. There is no indication in the scenario that the rogue radio is flooding the air with frames. While ad hoc networks can be used in DoS attacks, the primary threat in this context is the potential for unauthorized access to the corporate LAN.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"A rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security poses a significant threat, as it can open a backdoor into the corporate LAN. If a corporate client connects to the ad hoc network, it may bridge the ad hoc network to the corporate LAN, allowing unauthorized users to access corporate resources. This is particularly dangerous if the client is also connected to the corporate network via another interface." (Page 422, Wireless Threats Section) Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:
"Ad hoc networks detected by WIP are a concern because they can act as a backdoor into the corporate LAN. A client that joins an ad hoc network with open security may inadvertently allow unauthorized users to access the corporate network, bypassing the security controls of authorized APs." (Page 73, Ad Hoc Network Threats Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Wireless Threats Section, Page 422.
HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide, Ad Hoc Network Threats Section, Page 73.

NEW QUESTION # 84
You need to set up Aruba network infrastructure devices for management with SNMP. The SNMP server has this SNMPv3 user configured on it: username: airwave auth algorithm: sha auth key: fyluqp18@S!9a priv algorithm: aes priv key: 761oxaiaoeu19& What correctly describes the setup on the infrastructure device?

• A. You must configure a user with exactly the same name, algorithms, and keys.
• B. You must configure the "airwave" server as an authorized user. Then, configure a separate user for this device with its own keys.
• C. You must configure a user with the same name and algorithms, but the keys should be unique to this device.
• D. You must configure a user with the same name and keys, but can choose algorithms that meet the device's needs.

Answer: A

Explanation:
In SNMPv3, security is paramount and each SNMP entity (client or agent) needs to have a user with a security name (username) and optionally, a security level which determines whether authentication and encryption are used. When configuring SNMPv3 users on network infrastructure devices, it is essential to match the username, authentication (auth) algorithm, authentication key (auth key), privacy (priv) algorithm, and privacy key (priv key) exactly as they are configured on the SNMP server to ensure successful communication.
This is because the SNMPv3 security model relies on a combination of a username and a pair of keys (authentication and privacy keys) to uniquely identify and secure communication between the agent and the manager. The keys are used to verify the integrity (auth key) and confidentiality (priv key) of the messages. Using the same algorithms ensures that the messages can be properly encrypted and decrypted on both ends.

NEW QUESTION # 85
Refer to the exhibit.
How can you use the thumbprint?

• A. When you first connect to the switch with SSH from a management station, make sure that the thumbprint matches to ensure that a man-in-t he-mid die (MITM) attack is not occurring
• B. Install this thumbprint on management stations to use as two-factor authentication along with manager usernames and passwords, this will ensure managers connect from valid stations
• C. Copy the thumbprint to other Aruba switches to establish a consistent SSH Key for all switches this will enable managers to connect to the switches securely with less effort
• D. install this thumbprint on management stations the stations can then authenticate with the thumbprint instead of admins having to enter usernames and passwords.

Answer: A

Explanation:
The thumbprint (also known as a fingerprint) of a certificate or SSH key is a hash that uniquely represents the public key contained within. When you first connect to the switch with SSH from a management station, you should ensure that the thumbprint matches what you expect. This is a security measure to confirm the identity of the device you are connecting to and to ensure that a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is not occurring. If the thumbprint matches the known good thumbprint of the switch, it is safe to proceed with the connection.
:
SSH and network security protocols that discuss the importance of verifying the identity of devices before initiating a secure connection.
IT security guides that provide best practices for avoiding MITM attacks during SSH sessions.

NEW QUESTION # 86
Refer to the exhibit.

This company has ArubaOS-Switches. The exhibit shows one access layer switch, Swllcn-2. as an example, but the campus actually has more switches. The company wants to slop any internal users from exploiting ARP What Is the proper way to configure the switches to meet these requirements?

• A. On Switch-2, make ports connected to employee devices trusted ports for ARP protection
• B. On Swltch-2, enable DHCP snooping globally and on VLAN 201 before enabling ARP protection
• C. On Switch-1, enable ARP protection globally, and enable ARP protection on ail VLANs.
• D. On Swltch-2, configure static PP-to-MAC bindings for all end-user devices on the network

Answer: B

Explanation:
To prevent users from exploiting Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) on a network with ArubaOS-Switches, the correct approach would be to enable DHCP snooping globally and on VLAN 201 before enabling ARP protection, as stated in option C. DHCP snooping acts as a foundation by tracking and securing the association of IP addresses to MAC addresses. This allows ARP protection to function effectively by ensuring that only valid ARP requests and responses are processed, thus preventing ARP spoofing attacks. Trusting ports that connect to employee devices directly could lead to bypassing ARP protection if those devices are compromised.
The company's goal is to prevent internal users from exploiting ARP within their ArubaOS-Switch network. Let's break down the options:
Option A (Incorrect): Enabling ARP protection globally on Switch-1 and all VLANs is not the best approach. ARP protection should be selectively applied where needed, not globally. It's also not clear why Switch-1 is mentioned when the exhibit focuses on Switch-2.
Option B (Incorrect): Making ports connected to employee devices trusted for ARP protection is a good practice, but it's not sufficient by itself. Trusted ports allow ARP traffic, but we need an additional layer of security.
Option C (Correct): This is the recommended approach. Here's why:
DHCP Snooping: First, enable DHCP snooping globally. DHCP snooping helps validate DHCP messages and builds an IP-MAC binding table. This table is crucial for ARP protection to function effectively.
VLAN 201: Enable DHCP snooping specifically on VLAN 201 (as shown in the exhibit). This ensures that DHCP messages within this VLAN are validated.
ARP Protection: Once DHCP snooping is in place, enable ARP protection. ARP requests/replies from untrusted ports with invalid IP-to-MAC bindings will be dropped. This prevents internal users from exploiting ARP for attacks like man-in-the-middle.
Option D (Incorrect): While static ARP bindings can enhance security, they are cumbersome to manage and don't dynamically adapt to changes in the network.
:
ArubaOS-Switch Management and Configuration Guide for WB_16_10 - Chapter 15: IP Routing Features Aruba Security Guide

NEW QUESTION # 87
How should admins deal with vulnerabilities that they find in their systems?

• A. They should add the vulnerability to their Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE).
• B. They should notify the security team as soon as possible that the network has already been breached.
• C. They should apply fixes, such as patches, to close the vulnerability before a hacker exploits it.
• D. They should classify the vulnerability as malware. a DoS attack or a phishing attack.

Answer: C

NEW QUESTION # 88
Refer to the exhibit, which shows the current network topology.

You are deploying a new wireless solution with an Aruba Mobility Master (MM). Aruba Mobility Controllers (MCs). and campus APs (CAPs). The solution will Include a WLAN that uses Tunnel for the forwarding mode and Implements WPA3-Enterprise security What is a guideline for setting up the vlan for wireless devices connected to the WLAN?

• A. Assign the WLAN to a single new VLAN which is dedicated to wireless users
• B. Assign the WLAN to a named VLAN which specified 100-150 as the range of IDs.
• C. Use wireless user roles to assign the devices to a range of new vlan IDs.
• D. Use wireless user roles to assign the devices to different VLANs in the 100-150 range

Answer: D

NEW QUESTION # 89
What distinguishes a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack from a traditional Denial or service attack (DoS)?

• A. A DDoS attack targets multiple devices, while a DoS Is designed to Incapacitate only one device
• B. A DDoS attack is launched from multiple devices, while a DoS attack is launched from a single device
• C. A DoS attack targets one server, a DDoS attack targets all the clients that use a server
• D. A DDoS attack originates from external devices, while a DoS attack originates from internal devices

Answer: B

Explanation:
The main distinction between a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack and a traditional Denial of Service (DoS) attack is that a DDoS attack is launched from multiple devices, whereas a DoS attack originates from a single device. This distinction is critical because the distributed nature of a DDoS attack makes it more difficult to mitigate. Multiple attacking sources can generate a higher volume of malicious traffic, overwhelming the target more effectively than a single source, as seen in a DoS attack. DDoS attacks exploit a variety of devices across the internet, often coordinated using botnets, to flood targets with excessive requests, leading to service degradation or complete service denial.
References:
Cybersecurity texts and resources that differentiate between types of denial of service attacks.
Technical documentation and analysis of DDoS tactics, which illustrate how botnets and other distributed systems are employed to execute attacks.

NEW QUESTION # 90
You have deployed a new HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller (MC) and campus APs (CAPs). One of the WLANs enforces 802.1X authentication to HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM). When you test connecting the client to the WLAN, the test fails. You check ClearPass Access Tracker and cannot find a record of the authentication attempt. You ping from the MC to CPPM, and the ping is successful.
What is a good next step for troubleshooting?

• A. Check CPPM Event Viewer.
• B. Reset the user credentials.
• C. Renew CPPM's RADIUS/EAP certificate.
• D. Check connectivity between CPPM and a backend directory server.

Answer: A

Explanation:
In this scenario, a new HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller (MC) and campus APs (CAPs) are deployed, with a WLAN configured for 802.1X authentication using HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) as the RADIUS server. A client test fails, and no record of the authentication attempt appears in ClearPass Access Tracker. However, a ping from the MC to CPPM is successful, confirming basic network connectivity between the MC and CPPM.
The absence of a record in Access Tracker indicates that CPPM did not receive the RADIUS authentication request from the MC, or the request was rejected at a low level before being logged in Access Tracker. Access Tracker typically logs all RADIUS authentication attempts (successful or failed), so the lack of a record suggests a configuration or connectivity issue at the RADIUS level.
Option C, "Check CPPM Event Viewer," is correct. The CPPM Event Viewer logs system-level events, including RADIUS-related errors that might not appear in Access Tracker. For example, if the MC's IP address is not configured as a Network Access Device (NAD) in CPPM, or if the shared secret between the MC and CPPM does not match, CPPM may reject the RADIUS request before it reaches Access Tracker. The Event Viewer will log such errors (e.g., "RADIUS authentication attempt from unknown NAD"), providing insight into why the request was not processed.
Option A, "Renew CPPM's RADIUS/EAP certificate," is incorrect because the issue is that CPPM did not receive or process the authentication request (no record in Access Tracker). If there were a certificate issue (e.g., an expired or untrusted certificate), the request would still reach CPPM, and Access Tracker would log a failure with a certificate-related error.
Option B, "Check connectivity between CPPM and a backend directory server," is incorrect because the issue occurs before CPPM processes the authentication request. If CPPM cannot contact a backend directory server (e.g., Active Directory), the authentication attempt would still be logged in Access Tracker with a failure reason related to the directory server.
Option D, "Reset the user credentials," is incorrect because the issue is not related to the user's credentials. The authentication request never reached CPPM, so the credentials were not evaluated.
The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:
"If an authentication attempt does not appear in Access Tracker, it indicates that the RADIUS request was not received by ClearPass or was rejected at a low level before being logged. The Event Viewer (Monitoring > Event Viewer) should be checked for system-level errors, such as 'RADIUS authentication attempt from unknown NAD' or shared secret mismatches. For example, if the Network Access Device (NAD) IP address of the Mobility Controller is not configured in ClearPass, or if the shared secret does not match, the request will be dropped, and an error will be logged in the Event Viewer." (Page 301, Troubleshooting RADIUS Issues Section) Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:
"When troubleshooting 802.1X authentication issues, verify that the Mobility Controller can communicate with the RADIUS server. If a ping is successful but no authentication records appear in the RADIUS server's logs (e.g., ClearPass Access Tracker), check the RADIUS server's system logs (e.g., ClearPass Event Viewer) for errors related to NAD configuration or shared secret mismatches." (Page 498, Troubleshooting 802.1X Authentication Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide, Troubleshooting RADIUS Issues Section, Page 301.
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Troubleshooting 802.1X Authentication Section, Page 498.

NEW QUESTION # 91
This company has AOS-CX switches. The exhibit shows one access layer switch, Switch-2, as an example, but the campus actually has more switches. Switch-1 is a core switch that acts as the default router for end-user devices.
What is a correct way to configure the switches to protect against exploits from untrusted end-user devices?

• A. On Switch-1, enable ARP inspection on VLAN 100 and DHCP snooping on VLANs 15 and 25.
• B. On Switch-1, enable DHCP snooping on VLAN 100 and ARP inspection on VLANs 15 and 25.
• C. On Switch-2, enable DHCP snooping globally and on VLANs 15 and 25. Later, enable ARP inspection on the same VLANs.
• D. On Switch-2, enable BPDU filtering on all edge ports in order to prevent eavesdropping attacks by untrusted devices.

Answer: C

Explanation:
The scenario involves AOS-CX switches in a two-tier topology with Switch-1 as the core switch (default router) on VLAN 100 and Switch-2 as an access layer switch with VLANs 15 and 25, where end-user devices connect. The goal is to protect against exploits from untrusted end-user devices, such as DHCP spoofing or ARP poisoning attacks, which are common threats in access layer networks.
DHCP Snooping: This feature protects against rogue DHCP servers by filtering DHCP messages. It should be enabled on the access layer switch (Switch-2) where end-user devices connect, specifically on the VLANs where these devices reside (VLANs 15 and 25). DHCP snooping builds a binding table of legitimate IP-to-MAC mappings, which can be used by other features like ARP inspection.
ARP Inspection: This feature prevents ARP poisoning attacks by validating ARP packets against the DHCP snooping binding table. It should also be enabled on the access layer switch (Switch-2) on VLANs 15 and 25, where untrusted devices are connected.
Option B, "On Switch-2, enable DHCP snooping globally and on VLANs 15 and 25. Later, enable ARP inspection on the same VLANs," is correct. DHCP snooping must be enabled first to build the binding table, and then ARP inspection can use this table to validate ARP packets. This configuration should be applied on Switch-2, the access layer switch, because that's where untrusted end-user devices connect.
Option A, "On Switch-1, enable ARP inspection on VLAN 100 and DHCP snooping on VLANs 15 and 25," is incorrect. Switch-1 is the core switch and does not directly connect to end-user devices on VLANs 15 and 25. DHCP snooping and ARP inspection should be enabled on the access layer switch (Switch-2) where the devices reside. Additionally, enabling ARP inspection on VLAN 100 (where the DHCP server is) is unnecessary since the DHCP server is a trusted device.
Option C, "On Switch-2, enable BPDU filtering on all edge ports in order to prevent eavesdropping attacks by untrusted devices," is incorrect. BPDU filtering is used to prevent spanning tree protocol (STP) attacks by blocking BPDUs on edge ports, but it does not protect against eavesdropping or other exploits like DHCP spoofing or ARP poisoning, which are more relevant in this context.
Option D, "On Switch-1, enable DHCP snooping on VLAN 100 and ARP inspection on VLANs 15 and 25," is incorrect for the same reason as Option A. Switch-1 is not the appropriate place to enable these features since it's not directly connected to the untrusted devices on VLANs 15 and 25.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:
"DHCP snooping should be enabled on access layer switches where untrusted end-user devices connect. It must be enabled globally and on the specific VLANs where the devices reside (e.g., dhcp-snooping vlan 15,25). This feature builds a binding table of IP-to-MAC mappings, which can be used by Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) to prevent ARP poisoning attacks. DAI should also be enabled on the same VLANs (e.g., ip arp inspection vlan 15,25) after DHCP snooping is configured, ensuring that ARP packets are validated against the DHCP snooping binding table." (Page 145, DHCP Snooping and ARP Inspection Section) Additionally, the guide notes:
"Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) and DHCP snooping are typically configured on access layer switches to protect against exploits from untrusted devices, such as DHCP spoofing and ARP poisoning. These features should be applied to the VLANs where end-user devices connect, not on core switches unless those VLANs are directly connected to untrusted devices." (Page 146, Best Practices Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, DHCP Snooping and ARP Inspection Section, Page 145.
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, Best Practices Section, Page 146.

NEW QUESTION # 92
A client has accessed an HTTPS server at myhost1.example.com using Chrome. The server sends a certificate that includes these properties:
Subject name: myhost.example.com
SAN: DNS: myhost.example.com; DNS: myhost1.example.com
Extended Key Usage (EKU): Server authentication
Issuer: MyCA_Signing
The server also sends an intermediate CA certificate for MyCA_Signing, which is signed by MyCA. The client's Trusted CA Certificate list does not include the MyCA or MyCA_Signing certificates.
Which factor or factors prevent the client from trusting the certificate?

• A. The certificate lacks the correct EKU.
• B. The certificate lacks a valid SAN.
• C. The client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates.
• D. The certificate lacks a valid SAN, and the client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates.

Answer: C

Explanation:
This question is identical to Question 17, with the same certificate properties and scenario. The client (Chrome browser) accesses an HTTPS server at myhost1.example.com, and the server presents a certificate with:
Subject name: myhost.example.com
SAN: DNS: myhost.example.com; DNS: myhost1.example.com
EKU: Server authentication
Issuer: MyCA_Signing (intermediate CA)
The intermediate CA certificate (MyCA_Signing) is signed by MyCA (root CA).
The client's Trusted CA Certificate list does not include MyCA or MyCA_Signing.
The certificate validation process is the same as in Question 17:
Name Validation: The SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," which matches the server's hostname, so this passes.
EKU Validation: The EKU is "Server authentication," which is correct for HTTPS, so this passes.
Chain of Trust Validation: The client attempts to build a chain from the server's certificate to a trusted root CA:
Server certificate → MyCA_Signing → MyCA Since MyCA is not in the client's Trusted CA Certificate list, the chain cannot be validated, and the client does not trust the certificate.
Option A, "The client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is correct. The absence of MyCA in the client's trust store prevents the client from validating the certificate chain.
Option B, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN," is incorrect because the SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," which is valid.
Option C, "The certificate lacks the correct EKU," is incorrect because the EKU is correctly set to "Server authentication." Option D, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN, and the client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is incorrect because the SAN is valid; the only issue is the missing trusted CA certificates.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:
"For a client to trust a server's certificate during HTTPS communication, the client must validate the certificate chain to a trusted root CA in its trust store. If the root CA (e.g., MyCA) or intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) is not in the client's Trusted CA Certificate list, the chain of trust cannot be established, and the client will reject the certificate. The Subject Alternative Name (SAN) must include the server's hostname, and the Extended Key Usage (EKU) must include 'Server authentication' for HTTPS." (Page 205, Certificate Validation Section) Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide notes:
"A common reason for certificate validation failure is the absence of the root CA certificate in the client's trust store. For example, if a server's certificate is issued by an intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) that chains to a root CA (e.g., MyCA), the client must have the root CA certificate in its Trusted CA Certificate list to trust the chain." (Page 45, Certificate Trust Issues Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, Certificate Validation Section, Page 205.
HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide, Certificate Trust Issues Section, Page 45.

NEW QUESTION # 93
What is a reason to set up a packet capture on an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC)?

• A. The company wants to use ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to profile devices and needs to receive HTTP User-Agent strings from the MC.
• B. You want the MC to analyze wireless clients' traffic at a lower level, so that the ArubaOS firewall can control Web traffic based on the destination URL.
• C. The security team believes that a wireless endpoint connected to the MC is launching an attack and wants to examine the traffic more closely.
• D. You want the MC to analyze wireless clients' traffic at a lower level, so that the ArubaOS firewall can control the traffic I based on application.

Answer: C

Explanation:
Setting up a packet capture on an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC) is particularly useful in scenarios where detailed analysis of network traffic is necessary to identify and address security concerns. Option B is the correct answer because it directly addresses the need to closely examine the traffic of a potentially malicious wireless endpoint. Packet capture on the MC allows the security team to collect and analyze traffic to/from specific endpoints in real-time, providing valuable insights into the nature of the traffic and potentially identifying harmful activities. This capability is essential for forensics and troubleshooting security incidents, enabling administrators to respond effectively to threats.
:
Aruba Mobility Controller Configuration Guide
Aruba Networks Official Documentation

NEW QUESTION # 94
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HPE6-A78 exam is a computer-based test that consists of multiple-choice questions. HPE6-A78 exam duration is 90 minutes, and candidates must score a minimum of 65% to pass the exam. HPE6-A78 exam fee varies depending on the region, and candidates can register for the exam through the Pearson VUE website. Aruba Certified Network Security Associate Exam certification is valid for three years, after which the candidate must recertify by taking a recertification exam or completing continuing education credits.

 

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